Tech Juice 2511 Part III: Potential Impact of Disruptive Technologies on Future Equipment Profiles of the Armed Forces

Introduction

1. During my school days, I was deeply impressed with my English teacher, Mr Julius Paul Karikalan. He was very keen that we all fell in love with Shakespeare. As a young boy, I was trained to play the role of Julius Caesar for the school day. Cassius Clay, a lean and famished-looking guy, was the first courtier to drive a knife into Caesar when the court decides to do so for the good of Rome. Julius Caesar had earlier said the following to Mark Antony (probably his only true friend):- 

2.  At the end of this series of Tech Juice articles, I do not want some established players in the military equipment business and planners of regiments raised from them, to feel this way about me.   While I do think a lot, I am not thin, I sleep well and I am not dangerous.  The future battlefield is difficult to predict particularly at this time of rapid technological change.   It is, however, dangerous not to try and prepare for an uncertain future, if we are serious about winning future conflicts. From now on, whatever I say, is my personal views on what the future equipment profiles of the armed forces should be.   I am fully aware that this is a very controversial topic. 

3.  Industry & War.  Pre-industrial revolution, we fought with rifles and ammunition that were handmade and bespoke. Then came the industrial revolution with engineering drawings, assembly line manufacturing that ensured that parts were interchangeable and ammunition was not bespoke. Pre-industrial revolution, soldiers fought with till they exhausted their bullets, and then it was hand-to-hand combat in which the one with the best bayonet skills survived. Post-industrial revolution and the creation of op logistics as part of the art of war, there was enough ammunition to fight with and for as long as they wanted. It was the range and accuracy of the gun that decided things eventually. However, the bayonet stayed on as part of the rifle for nearly 150 years of the Industrial Revolution. Some of my army friends tell me that the bayonet is so sacred that it is still part of some guns!!!. I don't think new generation of leaders can afford such inflexibility when it comes to the technology of warfare.  Any nation could soon cease to be a viable entity with the military being relevant in national affairs with such inflexibility.  

4.  Equipping of armed forces is a very divisive topic. Big corporations have made long-term investments in production facilities of aircraft, ships, tanks and other capital-intensive assets.  They assiduously build an aura around their products through films, social media, military tacticians, books and events. These cloud reality like any marketing campaign and invariably, the personnel in the armed forces too end up becoming unwitting promoters of these wares. 

Types of Military Thinkers

5.  In my assessment I have seen three types of military thinkers, viz. the conventionalist, the technophile, and the shadow boxer. Let me explain. The conventionalist is the one batting for the kinetic inventory like fifth-generation fighters, nuclear submarines, aircraft carriers, high-tech tanks, guided artillery, long-range SAMs, cruise missiles, and so on.  Nearly 95% of career military officers belong to this category as they have grown up and enjoyed the perks of military service because of these systems.

The Conventionalist

6.  The conventionalist believes in building kinetic capabilities. Most of our armed forces are shaped by this thinking.  This thinking also originates in the previous industrial revolution.  Post World Wars the power of industry and quanity were the mantras to building a strong military.  Numbers mattered for tanks, artillery, submarines, aircraft carriers, fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, mechanised or conventional infantry and surface-to-air systems. Big defence and the military are in a tight embrace, and we have this relentless buildup of inventory volumes, assuming that future wars would be the same as the previous world wars, but with better technologies.   

7.  SAGW Systems.  The conventionalist also places a lot of importance on Surface to Air Missile systems. I have depicted a few well-known air defence systems in the graphic below. We have seen Israel’s Iron Dome in action recently.  The THAAD, S-400 and the MRSAM (Israeli Barak 8), are all potent systems. The missiles themselves have largely remained similar to earlier versions. However, the radar systems have become dramatically improved. In combination with the seekers, these radar systems can provide targeting class detection at 100s of kilometres and provide effective defence of a large part of the airspace. However, effective AD is always a challenge when you have 1000’s of kilometres of border and it is always possible to overestimate their capabilities. 

8.  Hypersonic Missiles.  One result of this over estimation is the hypersonic missile which was seen as the fast car that cannot be shot down due to its speed. The US military has gone whole hog in investing in space based IR sensors that can detect the unique signatures of the chemical reactions on the surface of these vehicles and have a counter attack. 

9.  Vulnerability of Capital Assets. Ukrainians have shown us that inexpensive small drones with explosives strapped on them are adequate to sort out formidable S-300, 400 batteries with at least three confirmed kills. The static nature of these systems appears to be their main vulnerability. Similar chaos caused to the Black-sea fleet is also well known. Speed, agility and camouflage of high-value capital-intensive assets are critical in the modern battle space. 

10.  UAS'.  Induction of UASs has also become a byword for military modernisation. The conventionalist is not averse to these drones as long as there is no major change to the doctrines of warfare which have cemented major capital equipment to the Armed forces across the world. The graphic below depicts two systems: kinetic and electronic suppression of air defence. The jamming pod is on a slow-speed UAV and the HAREOP, an Israeli product with a range of 1000 km, that can home in on and attack a transmitter. 

11.  Openly documented action of airborne satellite-controlled drones was probably first seen in the CIA attacks in Afghanistan. The ungainly predator drone became deadly with Hellfire missiles. The Air Force just maintained and handed over these drones in the air to CIA operatives sitting on the US mainland, for intelligence-driven missions with a very short sensor-to-shooter cycle.  Now we know that slow drones have poor survivability in contested zones, as can be seen in the Red Sea, where the Houtis have been taking them down easily. We are once again learning that agility and speed matter in a contested battle space to survive. 

12.  Cruise Missiles.  Stand off weapons and cruise missiles are acceptable in the mind of the conventionalist. Stealth is a critical technology that the conventionalist wants on aircraft, ships, missiles and tanks to evade radar. Conventional weapons though still are an important part of the weapon mix however advanced the aircraft may be. Glide bombs as a stand off weapon has also seen great traction. 

13.  Net centric warfare has become accepted parlance for the conventionalist as part of modernisation. Terrestrial and space based networks have been established, radars and GW systems have been integrated, operational practice has been built into the network and the new iPad generation is absolutely confortable with this. Cyber security now becomes a prime weakness and conventional commanders tend to believe that orders and discipline is the key to cyber security. The the cyber attackers can be innovative and keep us guessing. All advances that have been achieved presume a reliable communication and networking architecture. The cat and mouse game of Radio Frequency hopping, spread spectrum communication, jam resistant GPS, Low Probability of Intercept transmissions and many more physical electronic warfare methods are now well known and best practices can assure a reliable link. An armed force that is a stranger to these practices has not chance of winning any future war. 

Conclusion

13.  In short a conventionalist is comfortable with a time-tested doctrine.  He believes that performance of a strategy and equipment mix in past wars is a good indicator for the performance in future wars too.  He is essentially a status-quoist with strong resistance to change of priorities as technologies emerge and impacts the nature of warfare.  In the next part we will examine the Technophile who wants to change everything.  Watch this space.